At the core of the conflict in Syria, geopolitics comes down to a chess-like game; a game that has now come to dominate the framework of the US-Russian relationship. To be more concrete, the two superpowers have maintained clashing interests with regard to the proxy conflict in Syria. This is a conflict not over tangible gains or losses, but rather, as political realists in the sphere of international politics would suggest, for strategic power in the influencing in the Middle East. Briefly, the realist theory is based in realpolitik and Machiavelli-esque power policies; it claims that a nations platform is determined by nationalism, unipolarity, and force. To understand how these two major players have developed their roles in Syria, we must look at the domestic background in Syria that is at the root of this larger clash.
As a part of the 2011 Arab Spring, Syrian freedom fighters actively protested the dictatorial regime of Bashar-al-Assad, who inherited his position of power from his father. The protests grew increasingly violent and reached the point of a civil war between the government and seven major militant organizations, the most established of these being the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Thus, the U.S., assuming its traditional role of a global police force, had to choose between offensive and passive action. However, America had major reservations for taking the former approach as opposed to the latter, the most important of these reservations being that the U.S. could not decide whom it should support, because the revolution had been organized by non-state actors. Likewise, in further contradiction to the realist theory on state objectivity, the U.S. was unsure if to act in favor of the FSA because the power vacuum that exists could lead to a violent take over of jihadists—as was the result of Operation Cyclone in Afghanistan. Moreover, the U.S. did not want more retribution from the media after having been heavily criticized for creating a “no fly zone” in Libya through NATO. Finally, learning from previous mistakes in Iraq, the U.S. realized it had no follow up plan. In other words, the United States was in fear of getting stuck in the Middle East, having no stabilizing, interim government to follow the war. To this day, the U.S. continues to be indecisive on how to involve itself in the Syrian conflict. Russia, however, has put pressure on American action by backing Assad with weapons and aid.
Now, the Syrian conflict has become a power game between the U.S. and Russia. Putin is asserting himself as a Middle Eastern power where the U.S. is absent — in an attempt to match America’s control of the world. It has left America with two conceivable options: to make an offensive move into Syria and challenge the Kremlin or to not get involved and allow Russia to take away United States power by establishing a sphere of influence in the Middle East.
I suggest a more realist solution for the U.S. Since Russia is most concerned with military strength and responds better to force—as depicted by the Cuban Missile Crisis and the proxy war in Afghanistan—the U.S. should engage tactics that resemble a game of chicken. I posit that America should either increase its support in Ukraine, consequently threatening Russia dramatically and forcing them to a negotiation table, or to move troops into Turkey to give Putin the option of mutual deterrence by putting him in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Here, the US would not only threaten Russia’s sphere of influence, but also threaten its homeland. Nonetheless, in line with the realist opinion on the balance of power, pressing Russia this way would be less conducive to war than actually moving into Syria. In the words of a notable political scientist named Hans Morgenthau, “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”
